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Large labs may spawn spin-outs caused by innovations deemed unrelated to the firm's overall business.
Small labs generate demand for specialized services that lower entry costs for others. We develop
a theoretical framework to study the interplay of these two localized externalities and their impact
on regional innovation. We examine MSA-level patent data during the period 1975-2000 and find
that innovation output is higher where large and small labs coexist.  The finding is robust to across-region
as well as within-region analysis, IV analysis, and the effect is stronger in certain subsamples consistent
with our explanation but not the plausible alternatives.
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A striking feature of economic geography is the large variation in innovation productiv-
ity across regions. Silicon Valley and Boston are popular examples of regions that are
signicantly more productive than others in terms of innovation. In Figure 1, we illus-
trate a broader cross section of such variation using patent data on US computers and
communications. Even Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) of a similar size in terms
of the number of local inventors often dier substantially in terms of their innovation
productivity (number of citation-weighted patented inventions per inventor). For exam-
ple, Rochester and Portland had a similar number of innovators working in the computer
and communications industry in 1995, but Portland inventors generated almost double
the number of citation-weighted patents.
Regional productivity disparities have led to a variety of policies focused on enhanc-
ing local innovation. Such initiatives often focus either on encouraging entrepreneurship
(e.g., San Diego, CA, New York, NY, and St. Louis, MO) or on attracting large cor-
porate labs (e.g., Flint, MI, Greenville, SC, and Shelby, AL).1 We argue that eective
regional innovation policymaking requires an understanding of how the structure of local
R&D manpower is related to innovation productivity.
In this paper, we study how local innovation is aected by the organization of
R&D manpower in that region. For over six decades, since Schumpeter (1942), innova-
tion scholars have tried to understand the relationship between product market industry
structure and innovation (Geroski (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion et al.
(2005)). Other research has focused on the relationship between innovation and regional
industrial diversity, for example, comparing innovative output from cities focused primar-
ily on one industry (e.g., automobiles) with industrially diverse cities (e.g., electronics,
chemicals, and textiles) (see Jacobs (1969), Glaeser et al. (1992), and Feldman and Au-
dretsch (1999)). Despite this extensive literature, the eect of R&D labor organization
on local innovation has so far attracted little empirical and theoretical attention. We ll
1The 2008 Brookings Institute's Blueprint for American Prosperity oers a comprehensive overview
of such regional initiatives. For example, in San Diego, the CONNECT program has helped the devel-
opment of more than 2,000 small rms in the hi-tech and bio-tech sectors since 1985. New York recently
launched the NYC High-Tech CONNECT program modeled on San Diego's CONNECT. Similarly, St.
Louis implemented a number of policies to promote regional entrepreneurship. Flint, Greenville, and
Shelby focused instead on attracting large rms - GM, BMW, and Mercedes, respectively.
1this gap by combining insights from urban economics and entrepreneurship.2
We develop a simple theoretical framework to study the impact of R&D labor or-
ganization on innovation. The model relies on three main assumptions. First, following
Schumpeter (1942), we assume that large labs have an advantage in idea production.3
Second, following Cassiman and Ueda (2006), we assume that large labs only commer-
cialize innovations that \t" with their established research activities. However, if po-
tentially protable, then spin-outs may commercialize \mist" inventions that do not t
with the assets, mandate, or strategy of the parent rm.4 Third, we assume that the cost
of spin-out formation is reduced if a large number of small labs is present. This assump-
tion follows Vernon (1960) and Chinitz (1961), who argue that an increasing number of
small rms \thicken" local markets for ancillary services and thus reduce entry costs.
We develop a model that shows how the manner in which regional R&D manpower
is organized may have an impact on local innovation. The main testable prediction is that
innovation productivity is greater in \diverse" MSAs, which we dene as MSAs where at
least one large lab and numerous small labs coexist compared to MSAs of a similar size
but with only large or small labs. Because of the large lab advantage in idea production,
an increase in concentration of large labs (keeping constant the number of small labs)
increases spin-out formation. Because of small rm market thickness externalities, an
increase in the number of small labs (keeping constant the number and size of large labs)
renders a spin-out more protable. Under certain conditions, this trade-o implies that
spin-out formation is maximized when at least one large lab and numerous small labs
2See Cohen (2010) for an excellent survey of the the `neo-Schumpeterian' empirical literature. Our
paper also contributes to the literature on spin-out formation. While this literature has explored the
impact of parent rm characteristics on spin-out performance (Franco and Filson (2006)) and contrasted
spin-outs to other entrants (Chatterji (2009)), our paper is to our knowledge the rst to examine the
impact of regional R&D manpower organization on local spin-out formation.
3This typically arises when the lab can spread R&D xed costs over a larger number of innovations
(see Cohen and Klepper (1996) for a micro-foundation). Empirical evidence of such an advantage
is provided in Klette (1996), Henderson and Cockburn (1996), and Cockburn and Henderson (2001).
Alternatively, scale advantages may arise from division of labor eciencies (Arora and Gambardella
(1994)) or human capital complementarities (Jones (2008)).
4Prominent examples of such spin-outs include: Intel, founded by Andy Grove, Bob Noyce and others
to make a product that Fairchild was unwilling to make; Lotus Development founded by Mitch Kapor
that left Digital Equipment Corporation; and FreeMarket, founded by a General Electric (GE) engineer
after GE rejected his initial proposal. In 2002 the Wall Street Journal reported that in 2001 GE's
researchers suggested more than 2,000 new products but only ve proposals were accepted for product
development (see Cassiman and Ueda (2006) for additional examples).
2are present. Because spin-outs allow innovators to commercialize inventions that would
otherwise be abandoned since they are not a good t with their employer's research
activities, the number of commercialized inventions also increases when both types of
labs are present.
We test the empirical predictions of the model using a 26-year panel dataset at
the MSA-technology-year level.5 The data strongly support the theoretical model. First,
focusing on across-region variation, we nd that locations with rm size diversity in 1995
have an average 46% innovation premium ve years later compared to those without.
Recognizing the potential for omitted variable bias, we turn to within-region-technology
class variation over time (1975-2000) and use MSA-technology xed eects in our main
specication. We nd that in periods where at least one large lab and numerous small
labs co-exist, MSAs experience a 17% increase in citation-weighted patent counts. To
further address endogeneity, we show this result is robust to using lagged income tax
rates, which vary at the state level, as an instrument for regional rm size diversity.
High income tax rates induce entry and thus may generate subsequent regional rm size
diversity. Finally, we show that the main result is robust to disaggregating the rm
size diversity measure into separate measures for large and small labs, to focusing on a
smaller sample of just large MSAs, to focusing on a smaller sample that drops California
MSAs, to applying dierent measures of diversity with dierent cutos for large and
small rms, and to an alternate measure of diversity that uses County Business Patterns
Census data rather than patent data.
Next, we turn to examining whether the data are consistent with the mechanism
we focus on in our model that links rm size diversity to regional innovation. First,
we show that diversity is associated with a 32% increase in the probability of spin-out
formation. Second, since the main channel through which diversity increases innovation
in our model is spin-out formation, we expect that any barrier to spin-out formation will
5A number of case studies also provide support for our theory. For example, consider Portland, OR
versus Rochester, NY (lack of small rms) and Atlanta, GA versus Seattle, WA (lack of large rms) in
1995. In terms of Portland and Rochester, the number of inventors patenting in the \computers and
communications" technology class is very similar in the two cities (roughly 1,000 inventors). Nonetheless,
Portland outperforms Rochester, obtaining almost 50% more patents and about twice the number of
citation-weighted patents than Rochester. While both cities register a similar presence of large labs, the
number of small labs is substantially dierent: Portland has more than ve times the number of small
labs as Rochester. On the other hand, in the \chemicals" technology class, Seattle and Atlanta have a
similar number of small labs (38 and 36, respectively) and also a similar number of overall inventors (457
and 484, respectively), but only Atlanta has a large lab (Kimberly Clark). The dierence in innovation
output: Atlanta has 37% more citation-weighted patents.
3reduce the benecial eect of rm size diversity. We show that the eect of rm size
diversity on innovation is indeed reduced by the presence of strong non-compete laws.
Third, since spin-out formation in our model is predicated on ideas produced by large
labs that are subsequently deemed unrelated, we expect that regions with large labs that
maintain a narrower focus and thus produce more \mist ideas" will benet more from
rm size diversity. We show that the eect of rm size diversity on innovation is indeed
higher in regions with more narrowly focused large labs.
We exploit these mechanism-related ndings to assess the validity of our theory
against competing explanations for the positive association between regional rm size
diversity and innovation. Several alternative theories are consistent with a subset of the
correlations we report but none with the whole set.
We organize the paper as follows. We present a model in Section 2 and describe
our data in Section 3. We introduce the empirical framework in Section 4, explain our
results in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6. We include proofs of the theoretical
results as well as additional empirical results in the Appendices.
2 Model
Consider an MSA with T scientists divided into J large labs and N small labs. A small
lab employs only one scientist and cannot commercialize multiple innovations. Large labs
employ at least two scientists and have the capability to commercialize more than one
innovation. Moreover, each large lab j has an existing research activity that generates
prots j: We indicate as Sj > 1 the number of scientists working in large lab j and
denote with SL =
PJ
i=1 Sj the total number of scientists working in large labs. Notice
that T = SL + N.
We assume there are economies of scale in innovation: each small lab discovers an
innovation with probability 1=, and each scientist in a large lab of size Sj discovers an
innovation with probability Sj= with   T.
If commercialized in a small lab, an innovation generates prots equal to  with
1   > 0: For a large lab, the prots from the commercialization of an innovation
discovered internally are equal to  + a: The parameter a 2 R captures the \t" of the
innovation with the existing research activity of the lab (Cassiman and Ueda, 2006). A
positive value for a may arise because of scale or scope economies. Conversely, a negative
value for a indicates the existence of coordination costs between the innovation and the
4existing research activity. Alternatively, a < 0 may indicate the opportunity cost of
deploying resources from the existing research activity.6 Notice that an innovation is
protable for a large lab j if the prots from commercialization (+a+j) exceed those
without commercialization (j), i.e., when  + a > 0.
A scientist working in a large lab can implement the discovered innovation outside
the lab by opening a new small lab (spin-out). The cost of opening a new lab is equal
to k(N) with k(0) > 1; k0(N) < 0, and limN!1 k(N) = 0. The entry cost is decreasing
in N because the presence of other small labs generates a positive externality.7
The timing of the game is as follows. In the rst period, innovations are discovered.
In the second period, large lab scientists negotiate with their labs about the destiny
of their innovations. The possible strategies are: (i) internal commercialization (with
prots  + a + j), (ii) spin-out formation (with prots    k(N)), and (iii) non-
commercialization (with prots j). In the third period, spin-outs are formed and ideas
are commercialized.
Commercializing an innovation (internally or through a spin-out) may require the
development of subsequent technologies necessary to extract prots from the idea. If this
occurs, commercialized innovations generate new research trajectories. Conversely, the
non-commercialization strategy produces orphan ideas that do not generate follow-on
research.8
To solve the bargaining problem at period 2, we assume that the lab makes a
take-it-or-leave-it oer to the scientist.
Proposition 1 Established small labs commercialize internal innovations with  
0: Large labs commercialize internal innovations with +a  0 and a   k(N): A spin-
out is formed if   k(N) and a   k(N):
Figure 2 summarizes the destiny of an innovation discovered in a large lab. When
6See Bresnahan et al. (2011) for evidence of scope diseconomies in the computer industry.
7A possible micro-foundation of this cost can be provided building on the model of Helsley and
Strange (2002) where a large number of small labs generates a dense network of input suppliers that
facilitates spin-out formation. An alternative interpretation for k(N) is that in the presence of small
rms, the MSA develops a culture of entrepreneurship that induces employees of large labs to leave their
employer and start their own rms (Glaeser and Kerr (2009)).
8Empirically, this implies that greater commercialization may not be associated with greater patent-
ing (because orphan ideas may also be patented) but is likely to be associated with greater citation-
weighted patent counts (because orphan ideas do not generate new research trajectories).
5the cost of establishing a spin-out is large, scientists do not nd it protable to form
a spin-out and thus the large lab commercializes the innovations if the t with the
established business is high enough. When the cost of forming a spin-out is low (k  ),
then inventors form spin-outs to commercialize innovations that are not a good t with
the existing research activity.
We assume that a is distributed with a continuous and dierentiable cumulative
distribution F(a). Under this assumption, a spin-out is formed with a positive probability
as long as   k(N) that is satised if N  N where N is dened as    k(N) = 0.





F ( k(N)) if N  N
0 if N < N
:
Similarly, an innovation discovered in a large lab is commercialized (either inter-





1 if N  N
1   F( ) if N < N
whereas each scientist in a small lab discovers an innovation with probability 1=. Be-
cause in large lab j each scientist discovers an innovation with probability Sj=, the
expected number of innovations in lab j is S2
j=. Exploiting these results, we obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The expected number of spin-outs, NS, is maximized in the pres-
ence of one large lab and N  N. If T is large enough, then the expected number of
commercialized innovations, NI, is maximized in the presence of one large lab and N
small labs.
Proposition 2 indicates that the presence of large and small labs are complementary
forces aecting both innovation and spin-out formation. Intuitively, a greater concentra-
tion among large labs increases the number of ideas generated and the expected number
of spin-outs. A larger pool of existing small labs facilitates the formation of spin-outs
and thus allow ideas that are not a \good t" for a large lab to be commercialized. There
6is a positive interaction between the two eects. A large number of small labs has no
eect on spin-out formation in the absence of large labs. At the same time, an increase in
large lab concentration generates a greater number of spin-outs in the presence of small
lab externalities.9
Let us label an MSA as diverse if there are N  N small labs and only one large
lab. By showing that spin-out formation and the number of commercialized innovations
are maximized with diverse MSA congurations, Proposition 2 implies that any non-
diverse MSA conguration is dominated by at least one diverse conguration in terms
of spin-out formation or innovation.
Building on these results, in the Appendix we show that the distinction between
diverse and non-diverse MSAs is even starker. For an arbitrarily diverse MSA with
N  N small labs and only one large lab, we show that if the MSA is large enough, there
is no non-diverse MSA conguration that generates more innovation and spin-outs.10
3 Data
We focus on two units of analysis. First, we study cross-region variation and use MSA-
technology class as our unit of analysis (e.g., Rochester, NY - chemicals). Then, we turn
our attention to within-region variation and use MSA-class-year as our unit of analysis.
In constructing our sample, we begin with the set of 268 MSAs dened in 1999
by the US Oce of Management and Budget11 and the set of six one-digit technology
9For simplicity, we do not consider: (i) cannibalization and complementarity eects between the
innovations developed by the spin-outs and those commercialized by the large lab and (ii) imperfect
IP protection. In a previous draft of the paper, we showed it possible to obtain similar results in a
model with cannibalization, complementarity, and imperfect IP protection as in Gans and Stern (2000)
and in a model where spin-outs are formed because of disagreements between large lab scientists as in
Klepper and Thompson (2010). Intuitively, as long as the IP regime allows spin-outs to be protable,
the presence of local externalities encourages spin-out formation (formal proofs available upon request).
10In the previous analysis, we refer to an MSA as \diverse" if there are N  N small labs and only
one large lab. In the Appendix, we relax this denition and consider MSAs where multiple large labs
are present. We show that in this environment, it is possible to characterize a size threshold S such that
if at least one large lab exceeds this threshold, then the MSA outperforms all non-diverse MSAs with
N < N: This result provides a micro-foundation of our main empirical measure of rm size diversity
that is based on two cut-os: one for the number of small labs, N; and another for the size of large labs,
S.
11http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/metro-city/99mfips.txt
7classes described in Hall et al. (2001).12 This generates 1608 MSA-class observations. We
then construct our panel dataset, which includes 26 years (1975-2000) and thus contains
41,808 MSA-class-year observations.
We measure innovative activity, our main dependent variable, using a citation-
weighted count of US patents:
Weighted Patentsjkt+5: the forward citation weighted sum of distinct patents
with primary technology classication k and application year t + 5 where at least one
inventor is located in MSA j.
We use inventor address information to assign a patent to an MSA, exploiting the
US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency dataset to match cities and townships to
counties and ultimately MSAs. If a patent has at least one inventor from a particular
MSA, then we increment the counter for that MSA by one. Thus, a patent with three
inventors located in three dierent MSAs increments the patent counter for each of those
MSAs by one. However, if all three inventors are located in the same MSA, then the
counter for that MSA is only incremented by one.13
We construct this measure using all patents applied for (and subsequently granted)
between 1975 and 2000, with at least one inventor with a US address. We exclude patents
that cannot be attributed to an MSA (due to incomplete address information or a location
outside an MSA) and patents assigned to universities and hospitals. The US Patent and
Trademark Oce is the original source of our patent data. We complement these data
with classication data from the NBER (technology classication, assignee name).
Patent citations identify prior knowledge upon which a patent builds, and prior
literature (starting with Pakes and Griliches (1980)) has often employed the number of
forward-citations received by a patent as an indirect measure of patent value.
We also consider an unweighted patent count as an additional innovation metric:
Patentsjkt+5: the number of distinct patents with primary technology classica-
tion k and application year t + 5 where at least one inventor is located in MSA j.
Our second dependent variable is a measure of spin-out formation, which we use
in the latter part of our analysis when we turn our attention to the mechanism through
12This classication scheme includes: chemicals, computers and communications, drugs and medical,
electrical and electronic, mechanical, and other.
13Results are robust to constructing this variable using rst inventor data only.
8which rm size diversity inuences innovation output. We dene a spin-out as a par-
ticular type of lab. We dene a lab in MSA j, technology class k, in year t as follows.
First, we take all assignees that, within a ve-year window (year t and the four preceding
years), applied for at least one (eventually granted) patent in technology class k. Second,
using this list of assignees, we identify labs in MSA-class jk if there are at least three
dierent inventors located in MSA j who are named in class k patents of that assignee
during the ve-year window. Thus, if a rm has operations (i.e., R&D labs or facilities)
in n dierent MSA-classes, our procedure will treat it as n distinct entities. In any given
year, the number of patents attributed to such \labs" are thus computed by aggregating
by (standardized) assignee name, location, and application date.
We dene a spin-out as a new lab in MSA-class jk if among the patents applied
for during the rst year of lab activity we identify at least one inventor who previously
patented in one of the large labs in MSA jk. We construct the following variable to
measure spin-out formation:
log(Spin-Outsjkt): logarithm of one plus the count of spin-outs in year t MSA-
class jk.
Finally, our main explanatory variable is a measure of diversity. We construct this
variable by rst identifying the distribution of lab sizes in each technology class k and
year t. By construction, lab size has a lower bound of three (each lab has at least three
inventors). Across the various class-years, the median size is about ve inventors, the
75th percentile is about nine inventors, and the 97th percentile is roughly 54 inventors.
We use this distribution to dene large and small labs. A large lab is a lab where the
number of inventors is above the 97th percentile in the technology class-year distribution.
We dene a lab as small if the number of inventors is below the 75th percentile. We
arbitrarily choose the size thresholds for large and small labs (97th and 75th percentile),
but we perform robustness checks in the Appendix.
Diversejkt: dummy variable equal to one if in year t MSA-class jk has at least
one active large lab and at least 139 active small labs.
The number of small labs (139) corresponds to the 99th percentile of the distri-
bution of the number of small labs across the entire sample. Also, for this cut-o, we
perform a number of robustness checks in the Appendix. This measure intends to cap-
ture MSAs where both large labs and many small labs coexist. Notice that the diverse
dummy is distinct from a count of the number of labs because it considers lab sizes. It
9is also distinct from traditional concentration measures (Herndahl or share of top four
labs) because intermediate values of these measures may emerge both with and without
diversity.14
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables. The average MSA-
class has approximately 91 inventors and eight labs. On average, the inventors of an
MSA-class apply for about 28 patents per year, and these patents receive roughly 466
forward citations. The distributions of these variables are highly skewed. The median
MSA-class in our sample has only one lab and ve inventors who apply for three patents
per year and receive 33 cites.
The diverse dummy equals one for about 1% of the sample. The small fraction
of diverse observations is mostly due to the fact that a large number of MSA-classes
do not have enough inventors to display a positive diversity measure. In Table 2 we
focus on MSA-class-years that are \at risk" of becoming diverse.15 The diverse dummy
equals one for roughly 16% of this smaller sample. On average, these MSA-classes have
approximately 105 labs and 1348 inventors, who apply for about 381 patents per year
that receive roughly 6681 forward citations.
Table 3 illustrates the variation in diversity status that will be exploited in our
empirical analysis. We observe a switch in diversity status for 36 MSA-classes. The
rst MSA-class to become diverse is New York (in the chemical technology area) in
1976, although switches occur throughout the entire sample period. There are 11 unique
MSAs experiencing a switch in at least one technology class, and all technology classes
experience at least four switches.
4 Methodology
Our main econometric model focuses on the relationship between count-based measures
of innovative activity Yjkt+5 in MSA-class jk in period t + 5 and the indicator for rm
14To see this, consider the following example. MSA A has four identical labs, each employing a quarter
of the local inventors. MSA B has one lab employing half of the local inventors as well as a very large
number of small labs. In MSA A, the Herndahl index is equal to 1/4 and in MSA B the Herndahl
index is also (approximately) 1/4. However, MSA B has large rm{small rm coexistence, while MSA
A does not.
15The lab size distribution is bounded below by three (by denition each lab has at least three
inventors), and across the various classes-years the 97th percentile is roughly 54 inventors. Therefore,
our constructed cut-o is equal to 3x139+54=471 inventors.
10size diversity diversejkt in MSA-class jk in period t. We typically model the conditional
expectation of innovative activity as:
E[Yjkt+5] = exp(diversejkt + xjkt + jk + tk) (1)
where xjkt is a vector of control variables, jk is an MSA-class specic idiosyncratic eect,
and tk is a vector of technology class time-period eects. Notice that all the dependent
variables are lagged ve periods to account for simultaneity concerns.
Equation (1) uses the log-link formulation due to the non-negative and highly
skewed nature of our count-based dependent variables. Following Wooldridge (1999), we
adopt the Poisson quasi maximum-likelihood estimation that yields consistent estimates
as long as the conditional mean is correctly specied. We cluster the standard errors to
allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
When x in Equation (1) includes measures of the number of inventors working
in the MSA-class,  indicates whether MSA-classes with a diverse conguration receive
more citation-weighted patents per inventor; therefore, it is a measure of MSA-class
productivity.
5 Results
Firm Size Diversity and Innovation
Across{Region Variation
Table 4 contains our rst set of results, which show a robust positive association between
rm size diversity and innovation in cross-section regressions. We estimate all models in
Table 4 using Poisson, with robust standard errors clustered at the MSA-class level to
account for over-dispersion. In Columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the citation-
weighted patent count or, equivalently, the total forward citation count for issued patents
applied for by all inventors in the MSA-class in year t + 5.
Column (1), focusing on year 1995, shows a large positive correlation between size
diversity and innovation. In Column (2), we include a control for the number of inventors
in the MSA-class. The positive coecient on diverse now indicates that diverse MSAs
obtain more innovation per inventor. In Column (3), we show that the correlation
is similar when we control for technology eects. Exponentiation of the coecient in
11Column (3) implies that diverse MSA-classes have a 46% innovation premium over non-
diverse MSA-classes. In Column (4), we show a similar positive correlation measuring
innovation with un-weighted patent counts.
Within{Region Variation
Focusing on year 1995, the cross-section regressions reported in Table 4 indicate a posi-
tive association between diversity and innovation. Column (1) of Table 5 conrms this
result in a pooled cross section that exploits the entire sample period. While this cor-
relation is consistent with our theory, the result may be due to unobserved MSA-class
heterogeneity that is correlated with diversity and innovation. Moreover, the previous
regressions include MSA-classes that do not have enough inventors to display a positive
diversity measure. To address these concerns, in Column (2) we move to a xed-eects
Poisson estimator (Hausman et al. (1984)) with MSA-class xed eects, year eects,
and technology class time trends and drop all the MSA-classes that are too small to be
diverse. This specication isolates the within MSA-class co-variation of diversity and
innovation. The estimated coecient implies an increase in the citation-weighted patent
count of about 17% in periods where MSAs are diverse.
Column (3) shows that the qualitative and quantitative results are robust to intro-
ducing additional controls including the Herndahl concentration index for the labs in
the MSA-class and the number of active labs. This conrms that the diversity measure
is not simply capturing lab concentration or fragmentation. In Columns (4) and (5),
we show that results are similar in the larger dataset that includes small MSA-classes.
The magnitude and statistical signicance of the coecients are similar with longer or
shorter lag structures.16 Finally, in Column (6), we look at unweighted patent counts.
We still nd a positive and signicant correlation between diversity and innovation, but
the magnitude of the eect drops to 6.5%, suggesting that diversity has a greater impact
on the quality-adjusted measure than on the number of patents.17 Overall, the results
16The coecient on diversity equals 0.180 (p-value =0.013) with a seven-period lag, 0.119 (p-value
=0.01) with a two-period lag, and 0.085 (p-value =0.032) with a one-period lag. The correlation between
diversity and contemporaneous cites is positive but not statistically signicant (equal to 0.048 p-value
=0.12).
17In our model, for simplicity, we assume that all innovations have the same quality and dier only in
their t with the existing research activity. Introducing quality heterogeneity would still generate the
prediction that diversity is associated with an increase both in quality (total number of cites) and in
the number of patents. Whether the eect is stronger on quality-adjusted patents than on the number
12in Table 5 document a strong positive association between diversity and innovation.18
The diversity dummy is a natural empirical construct to assess the correlation
between innovation and diversity predicted by our theoretical model. In Appendix 2,
we show this correlation is present in regressions with both direct eects and interaction
(Table A2), conrming that an innovation premium is associated with the co-existence
of large and small labs and that the presence of only large or small labs does not drive
these results.
Instrumental Variable: Lagged Income Tax Rates
In Table 5, we introduce MSA-class xed eects to control for time-invariant heterogene-
ity aecting both local R&D market structure and innovation. To identify the causal
eect of diversity on innovation, we also need to address the potential bias arising from
the correlation between time variant unobservable heterogeneity and rm size diversity.
This correlation can arise in a variety of ways. A positive shock in the value of the tech-
nologies produced in the MSA-class may lead to an increase both in the entry of small
rms and in the likelihood of innovation. Similarly, capital market shocks (e.g., the dot
com boom in the late 1990s) may facilitate expansion of large rms and the entry of new
rms as well as increase the overall investment in R&D. Human capital shocks (e.g., an
increase in the H1B visas cap) may also lead to an inow of scientists in the MSA that
may cause a change in both lab structures and innovation. Similarly, local productivity
shocks due to availability of information and communication technologies (Agrawal and
Goldfarb (2008); Bloom et al. (2012)) may impact both the organization of R&D labor
and innovation. Finally, successful innovation may lead empire-building CEOs to engage
in takeovers and eliminate small rms from the MSA-class.
To address these endogeneity concerns, we need an instrumental variable that
aects rm size diversity but does not directly aect innovation. We exploit variation
in income tax rates over the sample period as an instrument for diversity. Many papers
have documented a positive relationship between income tax rates and self-employment
(among others, see Long (1982), Bruce (2000), Gentry and Hubbard (2004), and Cullen
of patents will depend on the correlation between the quality and the t parameters.
18We obtain similar positive correlations: (i) in panel regressions in which we use the 36 two-digit
categories dened by Hall, Jae, and Trajtenberg (2001) as the level of technology disaggregation and
(ii) in regressions in which the dependent variable does not include cites obtained by large labs.
13and Gordon (2007)). A common explanation for this nding is that self-employment
oers tax-sheltering opportunities through the deduction of certain types of expenses
(Cullen and Gordon (2007)).
If high income taxes induce some scientists to establish their own small labs, then
we should expect income taxes to be positively correlated with diversity. Additionally,
as long as states do not change income taxes in response to innovation shocks, we should
expect variation in income tax rates to be uncorrelated with unobservable heterogeneity
aecting innovation. Nonetheless, a possible problem with this instrument is that high
income tax rates may also aect spin-out formation, thus complicating the interpreta-
tion of the estimates. To address this concern, we control for both contemporaneous
and lagged (three years) income tax rates exploiting the lag tax rates as an instrument.
Intuitively, we expect income tax rates in year t   3 to be correlated with market struc-
ture (diversity) in year t because of their eect on past entry decisions. At the same
time, because we control for current income taxes, we expect lagged income taxes to be
uncorrelated with the current decision to form a spin-out and with innovation in year
t + 5.
Following Galasso et al. (2011), we obtain information on state and federal income
and capital gain taxes from the NBER Taxsim database described in Feenberg and
Coutts (1993).19 Our main tax variable is the combined (state plus federal) tax rate
that a representative household faces in a specic MSA in a given year. Appendix Table
A1 illustrates the variation of income tax rates averaged across states for ve-year time
periods. There is a substantial decline in tax rates in the late 1980s and an increase
in the early 1990s. The table also indicates variation across US states with dierences
between the lowest and highest rates of 7 to 28 percentage points.
We present estimates of the instrumental variable regressions in Table 6. Column
(1) reports the baseline OLS estimates with diversity non-instrumented. The coecient
on the diversity dummy implies an 18% increase in innovation that is very similar to the
eect estimated with the baseline Poisson model. Column (2) presents coecients of the
rst stage regression indicating that lagged income taxes are positively associated with
diversity. The estimated impact of taxes on diversity is large: a one standard deviation
increase in lagged income tax rates increases the probability of being diverse by approx-
imately 25%. The regression shows that current income taxes are not correlated with
19This data set contains income tax rates by year and state for an additional $1,000 of income for a
representative household (with $500,000 of wage income split evenly between husband and wife).
14diversity. In unreported regressions, we also nd no statistically signicant correlation
between spin-out formation and lagged income taxes (p-value =0.34). Together, these
results suggest that lagged income taxes may serve as a valid instrument for diversity.
Column (3) reports the second stage estimates with the diversity dummy instrumented
by lagged income taxes. Qualitatively, we nd that diversity is still positively associated
with innovation. The coecient of diversity is more than three times greater than the
one in the OLS estimate, but the standard error is also larger and the two condence
intervals overlap.20
While most of the previous literature studying the impact of taxes on entrepreneur-
ship focuses only on income tax rates, it is plausible that the eect of income taxes on
entry depends on non-income taxes that new rms are required to pay. To this end, in
Column (4), we control for capital gains tax rates. Because reductions in capital gain
taxes may be associated with other pro-business policies that aect innovation, we in-
clude this variable on both stages of the IV regressions. In the (unreported) rst stage,
we notice that capital gains taxes have a negative impact on diversity. This is intuitive
because high capital gain taxes reduce the prots that can be made by selling rm assets
and shares and therefore reduce self-employment incentives. Moreover, high capital gain
taxes may reduce the supply of venture capital that in turn will reduce entry of new
rms. Column (4) shows that the second stage regressions are robust to the inclusion of
capital gains taxes. The coecient on diversity is still about three times larger than the
one in the OLS estimates, suggesting that endogeneity generates a downward bias. Re-
sults are similar if we introduce additional controls, such as corporate taxes, the number
of labs in the MSA-class, and the Herndhal index.
Mechanism
Firm Size Diversity and Spin-Out Formation
The previous analysis illustrates a positive and robust eect of rm size diversity on
innovation. Our theoretical framework indicates that the main channel through which
diversity aects innovation is spin-out formation. This is consistent with previous liter-
ature indicating that spin-out innovation is superior to those of other entrants (Agarwal
20We obtain very similar estimates with a ve-year lag for income taxes. Similarly, including both
taxes in year t-3 and taxes in year t-5 as instruments leads to similar results.
15et al. (2004), Franco and Filson (2006), Chatterji (2009)).21 To assess the importance of
this mechanism, in Table 7 we investigate the relationship between diversity and spin-out
formation.
Because there is spin-out formation for only 4% of the MSA-class observations, our
preferred specication is an OLS regression with MSA-class xed eects, year eects, and
technology class time trends.22 The dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus the
number of spin-outs.
The coecient in Column (1) implies a 32% increase in the number of spin-outs
when an MSA-class becomes diverse. In Column (2), we introduce additional controls for
the number of labs in the MSA-class and their concentration. In this specication, the
estimated diversity coecient implies a 25% increase in spin-outs. Columns (3) and (4)
conrm the result in the full sample that includes small MSA-classes. The estimates from
these models show that diversity is associated with a 109% increase in the probability of
spin-out formation. Column (5) shows that in the large sample, instrumenting diversity
with lagged income taxes has essentially no impact on the estimated diversity coecient.
Overall, the results in Table 7 provide direct evidence of a positive correlation
between diversity and spin-out formation that is consistent with our theoretical frame-
work. It is important to notice that these regressions exploit a restrictive measure of
spin-out that relies only on patent data and requires inventors to patent both in large
and new small labs. To provide additional support to the idea that spin-outs are the
main mechanism through which diversity aects innovation, in the next sub-sections we
present further indirect evidence consistent with our theory.
Firm Size Diversity and Non-Compete Agreements
Because in our theoretical framework the main channel through which diversity increases
innovation is spin-out formation, an additional implication of our theory is that when
spin-outs cannot be formed, the benecial eect of diversity disappears and a single large
lab maximizes innovation. This result suggests the correlation between innovation and
21Our data conrms this. For example, in 1995, spin-out patents receive 30% more citations than
patents by other new entrants (average across all technology classes and MSAs)
22The conditional maximum likelihood estimation of the Poisson model drops MSA-classes in which
the dependent variable is zero for the entire time period. This is equivalent to dropping about 84%
of our data. With Poisson estimations in this smaller sample, we obtain a positive but statistically
insignicant correlation between diversity and number of spin-outs.
16size diversity is likely to be smaller in settings with substantial impediments to spin-out
formation. To explore this idea empirically we interact diverse with the extent to which
MSAs are located in states where non-compete agreements are strongly enforced. If
high enforcement of non-compete laws prevents spin-out formation, then we expect the
organization of the local R&D labor market to have no impact on innovation.
To construct a non-compete enforcement index, we follow Garmaise (2011) and
construct a measure based on the twelve enforcement dimensions studied by Malsberger
(2004). The index assigns one point to each dimension in which the jurisdiction law
exceeds a given threshold; its value varies from zero to 12.
The original index constructed by Garmaise (2011) covers the period 1992-2005.
We extend the time period from 1975 to 1992 by collecting information on changes
in non-compete laws. The only change we identify for the period 1975-1992 occurs in
Michigan in 1985.23 Using this extended dataset, we construct a dummy variable high
enforce that equals one when the index value is greater than or equal to six.24
We present regressions in which the diversity dummy is interacted with the high
enforcement dummy in Table 8. As expected, we nd negative and signicant coecients
on the interaction terms, indicating that the eect of diversity is reduced by the presence
of strong non-compete laws. The results are robust to introducing additional controls
and to using the full sample that includes small MSAs.25
In interpreting these results, it is important to remember that, for simplicity, our
theoretical model does not consider the competitive eect of spin-outs on large labs. In
general, the eect of non-compete clauses will depend on the relationship between t and
competition. Low t between an innovation and the existing lab activity does not imply
an absence of competition between the spin-out and the large lab. Christensen (1997)
provides a series of examples of companies not adopting new technologies because of
opportunity costs (e.g., low initial prot margins or low attractiveness to the company's
23Prior to 1985, Michigan outlawed non-compete agreements, but in 1985 it passed legislation that
enforced them. In the Garmaise (2011) data, the score for Michigan is ve. We assign an index equal
to zero before 1985 and an index of ve after 1985.
24Following Stuart and Sorenson (2003) and Marx et al. (2010), we also generate a state-level indicator
variable with a value of one if the state generally precludes, through statute or precedents, the enforce-
ment of non-compete covenants. Also, with this measure, the results strongly support the predictions
of the model.
25We cannot estimate the direct eect of highenforce on innovation because the dummy is constant
for all states over the entire sample period and thus collinear with the MSA-class xed eects.
17best customers) and eventually suering from competing with these new technologies.
If ideas that do not t also have a competitive eect on large labs, then the innovation
premium generated by diversity is lower when non-compete agreements are strongly
enforced.26
Firm Size Diversity and Large Lab Focus
In our theoretical framework, spin-outs are formed to commercialize ideas that are not
a good t with the main research activity of a large lab. This implies that diversity has
a greater impact on innovation the greater the number of mist ideas. Empirically, this
suggests an additional test to highlight the role of spin-outs as an important mechanism
linking R&D market structure and innovation: diversity should have a dierential impact
on innovation depending on the likelihood that ideas t in large lab research trajectories.
We expect MSA diversity to have a greater impact on innovation when large labs follow
narrow research trajectories and thus their ideas are more likely to be mists. Similarly,
when large labs follow broad research strategies, few spin-outs will be formed and the
presence of small labs will be less benecial to MSA innovation.27
26To see this, consider an innovation that in the case of a spin-out gives payos   k > 0 to the new
rm and  z to the large lab. Without non-compete agreements, the large lab will have to pay    k
to the inventor to prevent a spin-out and a spin-out will be formed as long as  + a   (   k) <  z
or a <  z   k. If non-compete agreements can be enforced, then the large lab can stop the spin-out










which is maximized in the absence of small rms.
Implicitly, our analysis rules out transfers from scientists to large labs. In a Coasian framework where
employees can pay their employers to leave the large lab, spin-outs may be formed even in the presence
of non-compete agreements. The assumption of frictionless Coasian bargaining is hard to justify given
the large evidence of transaction costs in technology transfer (Agrawal et al. (2012)).
27This prediction can be generated by our model assuming that a is distributed with cumulative
distribution F(a;b) where b 2 R generates a family of distributions ranked for rst order stochastic
dominance. For any b and b0 if b0  b we have that F(a;b0)  F(a;b): The parameter b captures the
breadth of large lab research activity. If b is very low, then most ideas have low \t" with the existing
research activity of the lab. Let us compare two MSAs with the same number of scientists T. In the
rst \diverse" MSA, there is one large lab and N0  N small labs; in the second \non-diverse" MSA,
there is one large lab but only N < N small labs. The dierence in innovation between the diverse and




(N0   N)(N + N0 + 1   T)

;
18To construct a measure of narrowness for large lab research trajectories, for each
large lab we compute the share of patents accounted for by the top four classes (C4 index)
based on its patenting activity across three-digit technology classes (the 426 dierent
USPTO n-classes) in a four-year window. For MSA-class-year cells with multiple large
labs, we construct the mean value of the index for the labs in the cell. We generate an
indicator variable, large lab focus, that equals one when the MSA-class-year C4 index is
above the median relative to other MSAs within that class-year.
As an example of the variation in the data, consider chemical patenting activity
in St. Louis, MO and San Diego, CA in 1994. Our data indicate the presence of only
one large lab in both MSAs. For the St. Louis lab, the top four three-digit technology
classes account for only 37% of its patenting, and the corresponding MSA-class large lab
focus indicator is equal to zero. For the San Diego lab, the C4 index is approximately
85% and large lab focus is equal to one for this MSA-class.
In Table 9, we interact this variable with the diversity measure. Column (1) shows
that the eect of diversity is stronger in MSA-classes where large labs follow narrow
research trajectories. Columns (2) show that the correlation is robust to the inclusion
of additional controls. Columns (3) and (4) show that results are similar in the larger
sample that includes small MSAs.
Alternative Explanations and Robustness Checks
There are many reasons why co-existence of large and small rms may be associated
with an increase in innovation. We rst assess several such reasons in light of their
consistency with the empirical correlations and provide additional results that help us
rule out alternative theories that might be consistent with a subset, but not the whole
set, of the correlations we report. We then describe a variety of additional extensions
and robustness checks for interested readers in Appendix 2.
Product Market Competition
Aghion et al. (2005) develop a theoretical model predicting an inverted-U relationship
between innovation and competition and present a series of empirical ndings consistent
which is decreasing in b. This implies that diversity has greater impact on innovation when large labs
follow narrow research trajectories (b is low).
19with their theory. In light of their results, there is the concern that rm size diversity
may simply capture intermediate levels of product market rivalry.
Notice that an important dierence between Aghion et al. (2005) and our setting
is that we conduct our analysis at the MSA-technology class level whereas their study is
focused at the industry level. We expect most of the labs in our sample, especially the
largest labs in diverse MSAs, to compete industry-wide at the national and international
levels. We do not expect their product prices to be substantially aected by the local
lab structure.
Moreover, the theoretical framework of Aghion et al. (2005) focuses on a duopoly
and has no predictions on spin-out formation. The inverted U-shape theory is also di-
cult to reconcile with our ndings that diversity has a greater impact when non-compete
agreements are not strongly enforced and when large labs operate in few technology
areas.
As a further robustness check, in Column (1) of Appendix Table A3, we intro-
duce the square term for the Herndahl concentration index. If the diversity dummy
is only capturing intermediate values of concentration, introducing polynomial terms of
the Herndahl index should substantially reduce the correlation between diversity and
innovation. Instead, we nd that results are very similar when we introduce the square
of the concentration index.28
Agglomeration Economies
Firm size diversity may be correlated with agglomeration economies that increase inno-
vation productivity of labs in the MSA-class (Ellison et al. (2010)). In all our regressions,
we control for the number of inventors working in the MSA-class, but this linear control
can be inadequate if agglomeration economies arise only for very large MSAs.
Notice that if only agglomeration generates the diversity premium, then it is not
clear why its impact is greater when non-compete agreements are not strongly enforced
and when large labs operate in few technology areas. Nonetheless, to further address this
concern, in Column (2) of Table A3 we introduce polynomial controls for the number
of inventors in the MSA-class and the total number of inventors in the MSA. If the
diversity dummy is only capturing agglomeration economies at MSA or MSA-class level,
introducing these polynomial terms should substantially reduce the correlation between
28We obtain similar results using higher degree polynomials.
20diversity and innovation. Instead, we nd that results are very similar when we introduce
the square terms.
In unreported regressions, we obtain similar results using higher degree polynomi-
als. Results are also robust to controlling more exibly for the number of MSA inventors
by introducing a dummy for each decile of the distribution and there is essentially no
change in the diversity coecient in regressions that exploit the sample of large MSAs.
Large Lab Demand for Innovation and Licensees
Another competing explanation is that the role of large labs as consumers of small lab
innovations drives the correlation between diversity and innovation. In other words, large
labs generate a demand for technologies that induces entry by small rms and increases
innovative output. Alternatively, the correlation may be driven by the role of small labs
as licensees of large lab innovations that do not t with large lab commercialization
strategies.
While we expect these forces to have an impact on MSA innovation (Agrawal
and Cockburn (2003)), alone these alternative theories cannot explain the entire set
of correlations that we observe in the data. In particular, they are dicult to reconcile
with the strong association between diversity and spin-out formation and with the nding
that the eect of diversity is weaker when non-compete agreements are strongly enforced.
Finally, we should expect large labs to boost innovation demand more strongly when they
operate in a variety of technology areas, which is the opposite of what we nd in our
data.
Strategic Patenting
Ziedonis (2004), Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004), and Noel and Schankerman (2006)
show that rms tend to expand their patent portfolios in response to potential hold-
up problems generated by \thickets" in the market for technologies. If regional rm
size diversity is associated with patent thickets, then the increase in innovation that we
register may be due to the presence of overlapping and fragmented patent rights and not
by the interplay of large and small rm externalities.
Previous studies, however, have documented the strategic patenting eect at the
technology level and not at the regional level. Because our regressions include technology
class time trends, they control for variation in \thickets" over time. Moreover, the
21defensive patenting explanation would suggest an increase in the number of patents but
a decline in the quality of the patents in the presence of regional diversity, which is the
opposite of what we nd in our data. Finally, strategic patenting is hard to reconcile
with greater spin-out formation (in the same technology) and with the stronger impact
of diversity of innovation when non-compete agreements are not enforced.
Innovation Aects Lab Structure
There is the concern that the correlation between diversity and innovation is due to
changes in innovation outcomes rather than driven by changes in lab structure. In
other words, \reverse causality" may take place if potential future innovation generates
expansion of large labs and entry of small labs.
To address this concern, throughout our empirical analysis we use a ve-year lag
for the control variables. The IV regressions presented in Table 6 also address this
concern by exploiting exogenous variation in MSA-class diversity. Finally, note that
if an innovation shapes the lab conguration, then we must explain why its impact is
greater when non-compete agreements are not strongly enforced and when large labs
operate in few technology areas, neither of which are obvious.
Additional Robustness Checks
We conduct a number of additional empirical exercises to document the robustness of
our main empirical results to alternative specications and measurement strategies.
First, Appendix Table A2 provides evidence supporting the correlation between
diversity and innovation in a series of regressions that distinguish between the direct
eect of the presence of a large lab, the presence of numerous small labs, and their
interaction. Columns (1) and (2) show that the presence of a large lab has no signicant
impact on innovation, whereas the presence of numerous small labs is associated with
a greater number of cites per inventor. Columns (3) and (4) show that the two direct
eects are not signicant once we introduce the interaction between the two variables
(the diversity dummy). These results conrm that the co-existence of at least one large
lab and numerous small labs boosts innovation, not the presence of only one of these two
factors.
There is concern that California MSAs, accounting for a large fraction of our
switches in diversity, drive the results. In Column (3) of Appendix Table A3, we show
22that we obtain similar results using the smaller sample of non-California MSAs.29
We also examine the technology specicity of the small rm externality. Speci-
cally, we look at whether the diversity eect is driven by the presence of numerous small
rms in the same MSA-class of a large lab compared to the presence of many small labs
in the same MSA of a large lab (irrespective of class). Column (4) of Appendix Table A3
exploits a diversity measure that uses a small rm number cuto at the MSA level rather
than the MSA-class level. The correlation between this alternative diversity measure and
innovation is small and not statistically signicant, suggesting that externalities tend to
be technology specic.30
We use patent data to construct the diversity measure, which may be associated
with measurement error. To address this concern, we use an alternative diversity measure
based on County Business Patterns Census data that reports detailed information on
rm size across US MSAs. Because these data are available only for a sub-period of
our panel, we focus on 1995 and construct a dummy (diversecbp) that equals one if the
MSA-class has at least one establishment with more than 1,000 employees and a number
of establishments with 5-49 employees above the 99th percentile. Column (5) of Table
A3 shows that results are robust to using this alternative diversity measure.31
In Appendix Table A4, we show that results are similar if we employ dierent
measures of diversity. We start by changing the denition of a large lab, moving its cuto
to the 98th and 99th percentile of the size distribution. We also alter the denition of
a small lab, from exploiting all the labs below the 75th percentile to using labs in the
50th-75th range and the 50th-97th range. Results are similar if we reduce the threshold
level of small labs in the diversity measure by 20% and 30% (from 139 to 111 and 97,
respectively).
In unreported regressions, we also alter the denition of the large MSA sample. In
the previous tables, we use the entire sample and MSA-class years where the number of
inventors is above 471 (the minimum required to have diversity). Results are robust to
29To conduct this exercise, we rescale the diversity measure using the distributions of large lab size
and of small rms in this new sample.
30We also examine whether MSA-classes with numerous small rms benet from the existence of large
labs operating in the same technology area but located in dierent MSAs in the same state. We nd
that this is not the case: co-existence of large and small labs is associated with an innovation premium
only if large and small labs are located in the same MSA-class.
31We obtain similar results using spin-outs as the dependent variable. There is no change in the
diversity coecient if we control for the Census measure of the number of employees in the MSA-class.
23considering MSA-classes that have more than 471 inventors for the entire sample period
or to having an MSA-class entering the sample when it passes the 471 threshold. Finally,
results are robust to dropping technology class 6 (Miscellaneous).
6 Conclusion
Our results suggest that the way in which R&D labor is organized in a region is associated
with its dynamism and growth, at least insofar as this is captured by rates of patenting.
Our ndings point to a potentially important role for market structure in driving the
performance of local innovation economies. Like Aghion et al. (2005) but on a dier-
ent dimension (R&D labor market rather than product market), we nd that extreme
structures are not optimal for innovation. Policies focused exclusively either on attract-
ing \anchor tenants" or on cultivating small entrepreneurial ventures may therefore be
missing an important opportunity.32
Following an approach that is common in the empirical literature on the determi-
nation of industries' innovative activity (Aghion et al. (2005), Bloom et al. (2010), Cohen
(2010)), we examine the interplay between rm size diversity and innovation by perform-
ing comparative statics in the regional organization of R&D labor. Because innovation
and regional lab structure are mutually endogenous, our empirical analysis exploits xed
eects, lagged dependent variables, and instrumental variables to identify the impact
of diversity on innovation. We leave for future research an analysis of the impact of
innovation on R&D labor structure, wages, and their evolution over time.
Our results also point to additional opportunities and challenges for further re-
search. While our characterization of market structure is richer than one-dimensional
measures such as the Herndahl index or concentration ratios, it still represents only a
rst step. We note that even on the somewhat easier turf of the product market, decades
of empirical research have yet to establish robust relationships between traditional mea-
sures of market structure and outcomes such as price-cost margins. Furthermore, while
we distinguish between incumbents' and entrants' contributions to overall innovation
activity, this represents only initial progress towards understanding the impact of local
32An additional implication of our results is that policies focused on facilitating spin-out formation
(e.g., amending non-compete enforcement laws) may also have a benecial eect on regional innovation.
It remains for future research to study how dierent policies may interact with the organization of R&D
labor organization and aect regional innovation.
24innovation market structure on the intensive versus extensive margin of innovation by
dierent types of rms.
Finally, our empirical analysis is sparing in its use of explanatory variables and
also relies heavily on only one noisy measure of innovative output, patents. We would
prefer to capture other factors that potentially directly aect innovation performance,
such as Glaeser-type \amenities," rather than through xed eects. Linking the types
of patent statistics used here to other sources, such as demographics or data on the
production economy, may help with external validation as well as provide the basis for
a richer investigation of local innovation markets.
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30Figure 2: Commercialization of Large Lab Innovations
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31Table 1: Summary Statistics; N = 41,808
Variables mean median Std. Dev. min max
Weighted Patentsjkt+5 465:72 33 2556:94 0 161861
Patentsjkt+5 27:73 3 118:42 0 6436
Diverse 0:01 0 0:08 0 1
LargeLab 0:11 0 0:32 0 1
# Small Labs 6:43 1 23:37 0 995
# Inventors 91:16 5 411:66 0 23689
# LargeLab Inventors 33:62 0 199:81 0 11725
# Labs 8:08 1 29:76 0 1318
Herf 0:27 0 0:38 0 1
Spin-out 0:08 0 0:26 0 1
# Spin-outs 0:18 0 1:80 0 158
High Enforce 0:27 0 0:44 0 1
No Enforce 0:21 0 0:41 0 1
Large Lab Focus 0:06 0 0:23 0 1
32Table 2: Summary Statistics; N = 1,870
Variables mean median Std. Dev. min max
Weighted Patentst+5 6680:68 4166:0 10093:74 418:00 161861
Patentst+5 381:71 268:0 413:65 72:00 6436
Diverse 0:16 0:0 0:36 0:00 1
LargeLab 0:96 1:0 0:20 0:00 1
# Small Labs 83:03 63:0 73:10 2:00 995
# Inventors 1347:22 905:0 1425:11 472:00 23689
# LargeLab Inventors 574:62 366:5 747:89 0:00 11725
# Labs 105:08 80:0 94:01 2:00 1318
Herf 0:15 0:1 0:16 0:01 1
Spin-out 0:57 1:0 0:50 0:00 1
# Spin-outs 2:35 1:0 5:62 0:00 111
High Enforce 0:24 0:0 0:43 0:00 1
No Enforce 0:30 0:0 0:46 0:00 1
Large Lab Focus 0:45 0:0 0:50 0:00 1
Table 3: Variation in Diversity (Year of the Switch)
MSA Chemical Computers Drugs Electronics Mechanical Other
Boston 1993 1995 1994 1992 1996 1996
Chicago 1996 2000 1979 1978
Dallas 1999
Detroit 1994
LA 1998 1995 1995 1993 1978 1980
NYC 1976 1995 1989 1987 1978 1977
Philadelphia 1996 1998
San Diego 2000 1998
San Francisco 1990 1989 1992 1987 1995 1994
Seattle 2000
DC 1998
33Table 4: Diversity and Innovation (Cross-Section)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Full, 1995 Full, 1995 Full, 1995 Full, 1995
Dependent Variable: Weighted Weighted Weighted
Patentsjkt=2000 Patentsjkt=2000 Patentsjkt=2000 Patentsjkt=2000
diversejkt=1995 3:762 0:406 0:382 0:296
(0:333) (0:185) (0:165) (0:106)
logInventorsjkt=1995 0:937 0:891 0:861
(0:050) (0:027) (0:017)
Constant 6:005 1:841 1:348  0:328
(0:140) (0:284) (0:140) (0:109)
Class FE X X
Observations 1608 1608 1608 1608
log likelihood  1260012:43  303371:15  168774:27  12157:30
Notes: Observations are at the MSAj-classk level. All specications are Poisson regressions estimated by maximum
likelihood. Weighted patents is the forward citation weighted sum of distinct patents with primary technology
classication k and application year t + 5 where at least one inventor is located in MSA j. The main independent
variable, diverse, equals 1 if MSA j in class k in 1995 has at least one large lab and more than 139 active small labs, and
0 otherwise. Loginventors is the log of the number of distinct active inventors in MSA j, class k in 1995.
Robust standard errors clustered at the MSA-class level in parentheses.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Table 6: Innovation and Lagged Income Tax IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: At-Risk At-Risk At-Risk At-Risk
Estimation: OLS First Stage 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable: ln Weighted ln Weighted ln Weighted
Patentsjkt+5 diversejkt Patentsjkt+5 Patentsjkt+5
diversejkt 0:180 0:683 0:836
(0:048) (0:236) (0:215)
logInventorsjkt 0:525 0:229 0:300 0:315
(0:076) (0:035) (0:069) (0:070)






Year X Class FE X X X X
MSA X Class FE X X X X
Observations 1873 1702 1693 1517
Num. Groups 149:00 149:00 140:00 121:00
First Stage F-statistic 17:53
R2 0:94 0:41 0:92 0:91
Notes: Column 1 replicates the specication estimated in Table 3, Column 4 with OLS. This specication serves as a
baseline for results when estimated with linear least squares. Column 2 presents the rst stage regression with diverse as
the dependent variable. logIncomeTax is the log of personal income tax in year t in MSA j's state. Column 3 presents
2SLS results with diverse instrumented by logIncomeTaxt 3. Column 4 includes the additional control logGainsTaxt 3,
the log of capital gains tax in year t   3 in MSA j's state.
Robust standard errors clustered at the MSA-class level in parentheses.
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
36Table 7: Diversity and Spin-Out Formation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: At-Risk At-Risk Full Full Full
Estimation: OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable: ln Spin-outsjkt ln Spin-outsjkt ln Spin-outsjkt ln Spin-outsjkt ln Spin-outsjkt
diversejkt 0:324 0:246 1:097 1:096 1:066
(0:071) (0:070) (0:110) (0:110) (0:321)
logInventorsLargejkt 0:071 0:007 0:063 0:061 0:059
(0:025) (0:019) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004)




Year X Class FE X X X X
MSA X Class FE X X X X
Observations 1873 1873 41808 41808 30552
Num. Groups 149:00 149:00 1608:00 1608:00 1608:00
First Stage F-statistic 91:24
R2 0:49 0:51 0:23 0:23 0:19
Notes: The dependent variable, ln Spin-outsjkt is the logarithm of one plus the count of spin-outs in MSA j, class k in
year t. The variable diversejkt in Column 5 is instrumented with logIncomeTaxjt 3 and logIncomeTaxjt 5. Because of
the ve-year lag in these instruments, the panel in Column 5 includes ve fewer years.
Robust standard errors clustered at the MSA-class level in parentheses.
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
37Table 8: Innovation and Non-compete Clauses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: At-Risk At-Risk Full Full
Dependent Variable: Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted
Patentsjkt+5 Patentsjkt+5 Patentsjkt+5 Patentsjkt+5
diversejkt 0:189 0:168 0:175 0:157
(0:064) (0:061) (0:072) (0:066)
diversejkt X high enforcej  0:152+  0:174  0:194  0:206
(0:091) (0:082) (0:084) (0:079)
logInventorsjkt 0:630 0:475 0:291 0:197





Year X Class FE X X X X
MSA X Class FE X X X X
Observations 1864 1864 41262 41262
Num. Groups 140:00 140:00 1587:00 1587:00
log likelihood  142174:66  138097:89  1342338:58  1328971:60
Notes: All specications are estimated by Poisson with Fixed Eects QML. The variable high enforce is equal to 1 if
MSA j is in a high-enforcement state in year t. A state is high-enforcement if it has a value of 5 or greater on the
13-point scale (0-12) based on Garmaise (2011). This variable is time-invariant during our sample period, and so its
eect is identied through the interaction with the time-varying variable diverse.
Robust standard errors clustered at the MSA-class level in parentheses.
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
38Table 9: Innovation, Large Lab Focus and Diversity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: At-Risk At-Risk Full Full
Dependent Variable: Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted
Patentsjkt+5 Patentsjkt+5 Patentsjkt+5 Patentsjkt+5
diversejkt 0:118 0:105+ 0:077 0:071
(0:060) (0:055) (0:062) (0:059)
large lab focusjkt  0:028  0:020  0:007 0:005
(0:030) (0:029) (0:031) (0:029)
diversejkt X large lab focusjkt 0:096 0:077 0:146 0:121
(0:041) (0:039) (0:055) (0:050)
logInventorsjkt 0:613 0:507 0:284 0:190
(0:070) (0:095) (0:032) (0:051)
largelabjkt 0:052 0:047 0:019 0:029





Year X Class FE X X X X
MSA X Class FE X X X X
Observations 1864 1864 41262 41262
Num. Groups 140:00 140:00 1587:00 1587:00
log likelihood  142142:56  139157:24  1339608:32  1327459:97
Notes: All specications are estimated by Poisson with Fixed Eects QML. The variable large lab focus is equal to 1 if
the C4 concentration ratio of the patenting activity across three-digit technology classes of the large labs in MSA j, class
k in year t is above the median value. This measure captures MSAs whose large labs patent in more focused (narrow)
technology areas.
Robust standard errors clustered at the MSA-class in parentheses.
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
39Appendix 1: Theoretical Results
Proof of Proposition 1
In a small lab, it is ecient to commercialize an innovation if   0: To avoid spin-out
formation, large labs need to oer the scientist    k(N). This implies that spin-outs
are formed if  + a   (   k(N))  0 or a   k(N).
Proof of Proposition 2















HSF ( k(N)) if N  N






2 is the Herndahl concentration index of large labs.
Dierentiation of (3) shows that NS is maximized when HS = 1, which implies
that at most one large lab will be present. Because there are no spin-outs if N < N, the
number of small labs that maximizes spin-out formation is the largest between N and
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NI increases in HS so it is maximized when HS = 1: Consider now the case in
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that is also decreasing in N. It is easy to see that z(N) > g (N), so innovation is
maximized with diversity if z(N) > g(0), which we can rewrite as:
(T   N)
2 + N > T
2(1   F( ))
or
T [TF( )   2N] >  N
2   N
that is satised for T large enough.
Comparison of Diverse and Non-Diverse MSAs
Take an arbitrary \diverse" MSA with N  N small labs and one large lab of size
(T   N). We rst show that this conguration generates more commercialized ideas
than any non-diverse MSA with N < N: Notice that when N < N, we maximize
the amount of commercialized ideas by allocating all scientists to a single large lab:
T 2(1   F( ))=: This amount of commercialized ideas is lower than the one in the
diverse MSA if:
(T   N)
2 + N > T
2(1   F( ))
41that is satised for T large enough. Consider now a non-diverse MSA with N  N and
multiple large labs, each of a size not exceeding T   N. Among all these MSAs, we
maximize the amount of commercialized innovation by allocating (T   N   1) to one
large lab, (N   N) scientists to a second large lab, and N scientists to small labs. The
amount of commercialized ideas of this MSA is lower than the one in the diverse MSA
if:
(T   N)
2 + N > (T   N   1)
2 + (N   N)
2 + N
2(T   N) > (N   N)
2   (N   N) + 1
that is satised when T is large enough. This shows that the diverse MSA dominates all
the non-diverse MSAs with N  N and multiple large labs, each of a size not exceeding
T   N.
We now consider spin-out formation. Because no spin-out takes place if N < N;
the diverse MSA generates more spin-outs than all the non-diverse MSA with N < N.
Consider now a non-diverse MSA with e N 2 [N;N] small labs and multiple large labs,
each of a size not exceeding T   N. The MSA generates the maximum amount of spin-
outs when we allocate (T  N  1) scientists to one large lab and

N   e N

scientists to




(T   N   1)




that is satised for T large enough because F( k(N))  F( k( e N). This shows that the
diverse MSA dominates all the non-diverse MSAs with e N 2 [N;N] small labs.
Relaxing the Denition of Diversity
Take an arbitrary \diverse" MSA with N  N small labs and multiple large labs of size
Sj with j = 1;:::;J. We rst show that this conguration generates more commercialized
ideas than any non-diverse MSA with N < N: Notice that when N < N, we obtain the
maximum amount of commercialized ideas by allocating all scientists to a single large
lab: T 2(1 F( ))=: The amount of commercialized ideas is lower than the one in the




j + N > T
2(1   F( )): (5)




j +N: Then a sucient condition
to have (5) satised is:
Sk
2 + N > T
2(1   F( ))
that is satised if Sk > S 
p
T 2(1   F( ))   N:
43Appendix 2: Additional Tables
Table A.1: Income Tax Rates
Period Mean Std. Dev Min. Max.
1977-1979 52:80 2:26 50 59:9
1980-1984 56:68 1:95 50 56:9
1985-1989 42:02 9:67 28 56:25
1990-1994 38:27 5:46 28 48:15
1995-1999 44:03 1:84 40:79 46:89
2000-2005 40:99 2:63 36:05 46:28
44Table A.2: Innovation and Diversity - Robustness with Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Full Full Full Full
Estimation: QML QML QML QML
Dependent Variable: Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted
Patentsjkt+5 Patentsjkt+5 Patentsjkt+5 Patentsjkt+5
largelabjkt  0:002 0:012 0:031
(0:039) (0:035) (0:032)




logInventorsjkt 0:288 0:292 0:290 0:191





Year X Class FE X X X X
MSA X Class FE X X X X
Observations 41262 41262 41262 41262
Num. Groups 1587 1587 1587 1587
log likelihood  1356561:51  1346174:30  1346108:58  1333246:93
Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered at MSA-class in parentheses.
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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